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author. 1. Introduction
Industrial Organization (IO) lies at the centerpiece of economic the-
ory. The “oligopoly problem” - the question of whether prices are de-
terminate or not in presence of only a few competitors - remains central
in economic literature and, indeed, it has proved to be one of the more
resilient problems in economic theory
1.
Since the seminal contributions of Bertrand and Cournot, IO ideas
and models have helped extensively in advancing our understanding of
price formation in presence of a limited number of agents. Furthermore
IO ﬁndings have furnished fundamental insights into ﬁrms’ strategic
behavior in oligopoly contexts, and as such those ﬁndings are nowadays
widely used to assist decision makers and practitioners in the regulation
of industries and in concrete, court-based regulatory cases.
Modern IO is ﬁrmly grounded into game theory, and recently new
and powerful tools have been added to those traditionally available to
IO scholars. These tools are usually denoted, in a concise way, as games
with strategic complementarities (GSC), also known as supermodular
or quasisupermodular games.
GSC are built up and studied on the basis of a ﬁxpoint theory and of
a theory of comparative statics that do not require neither continuity
nor convexity assumptions, while working for example with discrete
choice sets. In this respect, GSC are pretty innovative even within the
consolidated body of game-theoretical literature.
At the heart of GSC lies, however, an old and very familiar no-
tion in economics: that of complementarity in the sense of Pareto and
Edgeworth. In fact, once payoﬀs are shown to embody this kind of
complementarity, the joint best reply of the game can be proved to be
increasing in a certain sense. This increasingness notion, paired with
topological assumptions, allows to apply (extensions of) Tarski’s ﬁx-
point theorem to the best reply of the game and to show existence and
other important properties of Nash equilibria.
The theory of GSC is, as such, pretty complex; especially whenever
full generality is at stake. Furthermore, the theory is scattered in a
literature that spans a long time period and plenty of diﬀerent research
ﬁelds such as applied mathematics, economics and operations research.
1Vives (1999).
1Only recently all the pieces have been put together, setting up a general
and new framework for the analysis of IO problems.
2
In this paper, we review the theory of GSC from scratch to the state
of the art, with a strong emphasis on the notion of complementarity
that underlines the entire construction and on how this notion is used
to build up GSC. We organize a large amount of material in a uniﬁed
and self-contained frame, and we clarify the basic mathematical mod-
eling so that the reader may rapidly develop his own ability to deal
with applied research not falling entirely in the realm of well-known
examples. We will concentrate on why the assumptions are made, and
why that type of assumptions and not others. Furthermore, and maybe
even more importantly, we will shed light on the intuitions and concep-
tual points that lie in the background of the theory, and on how all the
aforementioned pieces blend together to set up a consistent method-
ological framework. For new results in the ﬁeld one may see Calciano
(2007, 2009, 2010).
As an example of our approach, consider that complementarity and
GSC are usually treated in the literature the context of lattices
3. How-
ever, lattices do not have much to do with complementarity. They are
just useful devices when the individual choice sets are not the product
of totally ordered sets. However, it is exactly in the context of choice
sets which are the product of totally ordered sets that complementarity
can be better understood.
Accordingly, the treatment in this paper does not start with lattices,
but introduce them when it is needed by the natural development of the
analysis. We present complementarity for choice sets which are chains
at ﬁrst
4, then product of chains, and ﬁnally lattices. We furthermore
distinguish between cardinal and ordinal complementarity, and show
why the latter should be introduced and what role it plays in the theory
of GSC: namely, that of making sure that properties obtained by using
cardinal complementarity are indeed ordinal properties; in the sense of
being retained under order-preserving transformations of payoﬀs.
We will prove every statement with the tools developed that far,
even at the obvious cost of longer, more pedantic proofs and more
2Is is worth remarking, however, that the theory of GSC ﬁnds application also
beyond IO.
3Lattices are partially ordered sets which have the inﬁma and suprema of all
their ﬁnite subsets. All the deﬁnitions will be given in the subsequent sections of
the paper.
4Totally ordered sets are also called chains.
2cumbersome notation. A cost due to our choice of not using lattice
notions until strictly needed
5.
The IO literature is full of extremely relevant applications of GSC,
and many papers are concerned with these applications, for example
Amir (1996, 2005 a, 2005 b), Bulow et al. (1985), Topkis (1995), just
to quote some of the better known works in the ﬁeld. Furthermore, a
very well-known advanced IO book, Vives (1999), is entirely devoted
to applications of GSC. A classical exposition of the theory, with ap-
plications as well, can be found in Topkis (1998).
As a consequence, we will not ﬁll our paper with applications. The
interested reader is referred to the works quoted above, which contain
themselves extended references. This paper is concerned with the for-
mal and conceptual structure of the theory of GSC, and as such it
complements the applied literature. Notwithstanding this, a ﬁnal sec-
tion contains selected examples from IO which are presented here for
the sake of illustrating some aspects of the techniques that are less clear
and not so used in the applied literature but that, we believe, can be
useful and conductive of new applications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and analyzes
the cardinal and ordinal notion of complementarity. Section 3 compares
and contrasts these two notions. Sections 4, 5, 6 examine the eﬀects
of complementarity on individual decision problems in the context of
chains, products of chains, and lattices respectively. Section 7 intro-
duces and studies games with strategic complementarities. Section 8
contains IO applications.
2. Cardinal and ordinal complementarity
Complementarity is an old notion in economics. Samuelson (1974)
presents an authoritative historical perspective on it, and surveys the
idea of Pareto-Edgeworth complementarity, giving it the meaning of
an externality among activities. Samuelson’s reconstruction lies at the
basis of the current approach to complementarity.
Consider an agent having preferences whose cardinality allows him to
add own utility indeces. Consider a consumption bundle where tea and
lemon are present. According to Samuelson, tea and lemon are Pareto-
Edgeworth complements whenever, keeping all other goods ﬁxed, a
joint increase of tea and lemon gives the agent a beneﬁt exceeding the
5We will not prove purely topological result, because proving them would fall
beside the scope of the paper. Full references will be given for those results.
3sum of beneﬁts that he would get by increasing them separately. This
means that an increase of, say, tea makes an increase of lemon more
desirable: the increase of tea exerts a positive externality on increasing
lemon.
Later literature (Bulow et al., 1985) independently rediscovers Samuel-
son’s approach, calling“strategic complements”what Samuelson called
Pareto-Edgeworth complements. Of course, in general there is no rea-
son to qualify a complementarity relation as“strategic”. But the termi-
nology has spread out in economics at large. We point out, then, that
strategic complementarity is exactly Pareto-Edgeworth complementar-
ity, and call it simply“complementarity”from now on.
Samuelson heuristic description translates directly into a property
of the utility function. Let R2 be the commodity space, with typical
element (x,t), where x is the amount of lemon and t is the amount of
tea. Start from a consumption bundle (x1,t1). Consider a consumption
bundle (x2,t2), with x1 < x2 and t1 < t2. At (x2,t1) we would have
increased only lemon. At (x1,t2) we would have increased only tea. At
(x2,t2) we would have increased both.
Samuelson description of complementarity says that:




(1) u(x2,t1) − u(x1,t1) ≤ u(x2,t2) − u(x1,t2).
This property has a modern name. Let X be a poset (a partially
ordered set), T be a set, and u : X × T → R. For ﬁxed x1,x2 ∈ X,
with x1 < x2, call the expression
u(x2,t) − u(x1,t)
a ﬁrst diﬀerence of u in x. This is clearly a function of t.
Deﬁnition 1. (Increasing differences). Let u(x,t) : X × T →
R, where X and T are posets. u has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) if
every ﬁrst diﬀerence of u in x is increasing in t; that is, if for every
x1,x2 ∈ X with x1 < x2, for every t1,t2 ∈ T with t1 < t2, inequality
(1) holds.
4Deﬁnition 2. (Cardinal complementarity). Let u(x,t) : X ×
T → R, where X and T are posets. We say that activities x and t are
cardinal complements if u has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t).
It is clear from the deﬁnition that u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences
in (x,t) if and only if it has also increasing diﬀerences in (t,x), by which
we mean that any ﬁrst diﬀerence of u(x,t) in t, i.e. any
u(x,t2) − u(x,t1)
with t1 < t2, is increasing in x. Hence the cardinal complementarity
relation is symmetric. We will come back to this important point in
the sequel.
In applications, to check if two one-dimensional activities x,t are
cardinal complements, one often uses the following immediate result.
Lemma 1. (Differential characterization of cardinal com-
plementarity). Let u(x,t) : R × R → R be diﬀerentiable in x for
every t, and let ux (x,t) be diﬀerentiable in t for every x.
u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) if and only if for every
(x,t) ∈ R2, uxt (x,t) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, if for every (x,t) ∈ R2, uxt (x,t) > 0, then u(x,t) has
strict increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) (meaning that (1) holds with strict
inequality).
Proof: If u has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), then for every t1,t2 ∈
R with t1 < t2, and for every distinct x,x0 ∈ R, we have that
u(x,t2) − u(x0,t2) − [u(x,t1) − u(x0,t1)]
x − x0
≥ 0.
Taking limit as x → x0, we get that ux (x0,t2) ≥ ux (x0,t1). Hence
ux (x,t) is increasing in t, and so for every x and every distinct t,t0 in
R,
ux (x,t) − ux (x,t0)
t − t0
≥ 0.
Taking limit as t → t0, we get the result.
Let now uxt (x,t) ≥ (>)0 for every (x,t) ∈ R2. Since for every x
ux (x,t) is diﬀerentiable in t, then by the intermediate value theorem,
for every t1,t2 with t1 < t2, there exists some β ∈ (t1,t2) such that
ux (x,t2) − ux (x,t1)
t2 − t1
= uxt (x,β) ≥ (>)0,
5meaning that for every x, ux (x,t2) − ux (x,t1) ≥ (>)0. Hence for
u(x,t2)−u(x,t1), which is a diﬀerentiable function of x, by the inter-
mediate value theorem we have that, for every x1 < x2, there is some
α ∈ (x1,x2) such that
u(x2,t2) − u(x2,t1) − [u(x1,t2) − u(x1,t1)]
x2 − x1
=
ux (α,t2) − ux (α,t1) ≥ (>)0.
Hence
u(x2,t2) − u(x2,t1) − [u(x1,t2) − u(x1,t1)] ≥ (>)0,
and u has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in (x,t). 
Remark: conventional complementarity. Bulow etc. (1985)
deﬁne“conventional”complementarity as a positive eﬀects of increasing
one activity, say t, on total proﬁts. In these terms, x is a conventional
complement of t if ux (x,t) ≥ 0, i.e. if payoﬀ is increasing in t for every
x. On the other hand, strategic complementarity means that increasing
activity t has a positive eﬀects on the marginal proﬁts associated to x,
that is, uxt (x,t) ≥ 0. While this approach justiﬁes the distinction, the
term “strategic” still sounds arbitrary. It is referred to the fact that
activity t is controlled by some opponent of the player at stake in a
game setting.
Lemma 2. (Multidimensional increasing differences). Let
u(x,t) : X × T → R, with X = X1 × ··· × Xm and T = T1 × ··· × Tn,
each factor in the products being a poset.
u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in ((x1,...,xm),(t1,...,tn)) on X×




n) in X × T, for every









n) : Xi × Tj → R
has increasing diﬀerences in (xi,tj) on Xi × Tj.
Proof: Necessity is trivial. For suﬃciency, we need two steps.
STEP 1. We ﬁrst prove that u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in
(xi,(t1,...,tn))
for any i = 1,...,m and any ﬁxed x−i, where given any x in X, x−i is
the projection of x onto all of its coordinates except for the ith one.







6Set (t2,...,tn) = (t0
2,...,t0
n). By assumption u has increasing diﬀer-






















Set now (t1,t3,...,tn) = (t00
1,t0
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n). By assumption, u has increas-



















n). By assumption, u has in-




















































So u has increasing diﬀerences in (xi,(t1,...,tn)) for any ﬁxed (x2,...,xn).
Redo the argument for i = 2,...,m.






















increasing diﬀerences in (x1,(t1,...,tn)), and hence in ((t1,...,tn),x1)
(here we use that increasing diﬀerences does not distinguish between
























7Fix now (x1,x3,...,xm) = (x00
1,x0
3,...,x0
m). By Step 1, u has increasing
diﬀerences in (x2,(t1,...,tn)), and so u has increasing diﬀerences in



















































This prove that u has increasing diﬀerences in ((x1,...,xm),(t1,...,tn))
on X × T. 
Corollary 1. (Differential characterization of multidi-
mensional increasing differences). Let u(x,t) : Rm × Rn → R
be twice diﬀerentiable on Rm × Rn (but we need less, see the assump-
tions in Lemma 1).
u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) on Rm × Rn if and only if,
for every i = 1,...,m; every j = 1,...,n; and every (x,t) in Rm ×Rn,
uxitj (x,t) ≥ 0.
Proof: Immediate by applying ﬁrst Lemma 2 and then Lemma 1 .
A weaker, ordinal (preserved under increasing transformations of
payoﬀs) notion of complementarity has been introduced by Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) by observing that, in the inequality deﬁning in-
creasing diﬀerences, if the left-hand-side diﬀerence is (strictly) greater
than some real k, then the right-hand-side diﬀerence must also be
(strictly) greater than k. Normalizing k = 0, this means that whenever
an increase of lemon is desirable at a ﬁxed level of tea, this increase
remains desirable if tea increases too. This property represents a weak
notion of Pareto-Edgeworth complementarity, and is formalized in the
deﬁnition of single crossing property.
Deﬁnition 3. (Single crossing property). Let X and T be
posets. Function u(x,t) : X × T → R has the single crossing property
8in (x,t) if any ﬁrst diﬀerence of u(x,t) in x which is (strictly) positive
at some t, remains (strictly) positive as t increases. That is, if for every
x1,x2 ∈ X with x1 < x2, for every t1,t2 ∈ T with t1 < t2,
u(x1,t1) ≤ u(x2,t1) ⇒ u(x1,t2) ≤ u(x2,t2);
u(x1,t1) < u(x2,t1) ⇒ u(x1,t2) < u(x2,t2).
Clearly, if function u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), it also
satisﬁes the single crossing property in (x,t), while the contrary does
not hold necessarily, as can be shown easily.
Deﬁnition 4. (Ordinal complementarity). Let u(x,t) : X ×
T → R, where X and T are posets. We say that activities x and t are
ordinal complements if u(x,t) has the single crossing property in (x,t).
The fact that u(x,t) has the single crossing property in (x,t) does
not imply that it has the single crossing property in (t,x), i.e. it does
not imply that whenever any ﬁrst diﬀerence of u(x,t) in t is (strictly)
positive at some x, it remains so as x increases. Hence, contrary to
cardinal complementarity, ordinal complementarity does not generate
a symmetric relation. We elaborate on this fact in the next Section.
3. Cardinal versus ordinal complementarity
3.1. On the lack of symmetry of ordinal complementarity. We
have seen that a function u(x,t) has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) if
and only if it has increasing diﬀerences in (t,x). Hence, if increas-
ing diﬀerences in (x,t) is meant to deﬁne the binary relation: “x is a
cardinal complement of t”, this relation is symmetric.
On contrary, the single crossing condition depends on the variable
with respect to whom the ﬁrst diﬀerence is taken. Single crossing in












9If any such ﬁrst diﬀerence is strictly positive6, then t must be strictly
positive as well, and so this ﬁrst diﬀerence stays strictly positive as t
increases, albeit being decreasing in t. Thus u has the single crossing
property in (x,t).
On the other hand, u(x,t) fails to have the single crossing property
in (t,x), since for any t1 < t2 the corresponding ﬁrst diﬀerence of u in









+ t2 − t1
which for t1 = 1 and t2 = 2 becomes −x
2 + 1, which in turn is strictly
positive at x = 1 but nonpositive at any x ≥ 2.
If the single crossing property in (x,t) is take as a deﬁnition of the
binary relation “x is an ordinal complement of t”, this relation is not
symmetric.
This lack of symmetry is much more than a curiosity. It will require
to add extra assumptions on payoﬀs when studying the comparative
statics of the set of maximizers of u(x,t) in a purely ordinal context.
We will turn to this issue in subsection 5.2.
3.2. On some apparent inconsistency between cardinal and or-
dinal complementarity. We now exhibit a payoﬀ function where the
two activities x and t are both ordinal complements and cardinal sub-
stitutes.





with t 6= 0. We have seen that it satisﬁes the single crossing property
in (x,t). On the restricted domain {(x,t) : x ≤ 1 ≤ t}, the function
satisﬁes also the single crossing property in (t,x). Indeed, for every








+ t2 − t1







multiplying it by any x ≤ 1, we see that
this ﬁrst diﬀerence remain positive or, respectively, strictly positive.
Hence u(x,t) satisﬁes the single crossing property in (t,x) on the stated
domain.
6It can never be 0
10However, our function has decreasing diﬀerences in (x,t), since
uxt (x,t) = −
1
t2 < 0
for all x and all t 6= 0. Hence for this function, on the stated domain,
the two activities x and t are both ordinal complements and cardinal
substitutes.
This fact is due to the increased generality of the notion of ordinal
complementarity relative to that of cardinal complementarity, but how-
ever does not represent an instance of logical inconsistency of the two
notions. Indeed, as we will see in the sequel, any GSC-result driven
by cardinal complementarity of payoﬀs holds for any order-preserving
transformation of these payoﬀs, and so what really drives the result
are not the cardinal properties, but the ordinal ones, which are pre-
served by deﬁnition under these transformations. Thus we can well
transform cardinal complementarity into cardinal substitutability, for
example getting the function of the example, without loosing any GSC-
conclusion.
In terms of the complementarity relations, in our example the activ-
ities being cardinal substitutes are also ordinal substitutes. Hence they
are indeed ordinally“neutral”with each other.
4. Monotone comparative statics on chains
Let Bt be the set of maximizers over X of function u(x,t) : X×T →
R. We keep the assumption, in the comparative statics results below,
that Bt is nonempty for every t in T. Conditions to assure that this is
indeed the case in the various contexts will be introduced separately.
In view of these conditions, however, we introduce here an appropriate
intrinsic topology for posets.
Deﬁnition 5. (Interval topology). Let X be a poset. The in-
terval topology of X is the topology generated by taking the closed
intervals
[y,z] = {x ∈ X : y ≤ x ≤ z},
with y,z ∈ X, as a subbasis for closed sets.
For the sake of applications, we recall that in Rn the interval topology
is equivalent to the standard topology (Frink, see Birkhoﬀ, 1967, Ch.
X).
11The simplest case is that in which the choice set X is a chain (a
totally ordered set, for example a subset of R). We have the following
comparative statics result.
Theorem 1. (Comparative statics on chains, cardinal case).
Let X be a chain, T be a poset and let u(x,t) : X × T → R have in-
creasing diﬀerences in (x,t). For every t1 < t2, for every a ∈ Bt1 and
every b ∈ Bt2, min{a,b} ∈ Bt1 and max{a,b} ∈ Bt2.
Proof: If a ≤ b we are done. Let then b < a. We have that
0 ≤ u(a,t1) − u(b,t1) ≤ u(a,t2) − u(b,t2) ≤ 0,
where the ﬁrst and last inequality follow from optimality, and the
middle-one follows from increasing diﬀerences. Hence b ∈ Bt1, and
a ∈ Bt2. 
The generalization to the ordinal case is immediate, and the proof is
a prototype of how the inequalities of the single crossing property work
in monotone comparative statics theorems. Hence it is instructive to
ﬁll in all the details.
Theorem 2. (Comparative statics on chains, ordinal case).
Let X be a chain, T be a poset and let u(x,t) : X ×T → R satisfy the
single crossing property in (x,t). For every t1 < t2, for every a ∈ Bt1
and every b ∈ Bt2, min{a,b} ∈ Bt1 and max{a,b} ∈ Bt2.
Proof: If a ≤ b we are done. Let then b < a. By the optimality of a
at t1
u(a,t1) − u(b,t1) ≥ 0,
and hence by the single crossing property
u(a,t2) − u(b,t2) ≥ 0,
which implies, by the optimality of b at t2, that a ∈ Bt2. On the other
hand, by optimality of b at t2, the following inequality fails:
u(a,t2) − u(b,t2) > 0.
Hence, by the single crossing property,
u(a,t1) − u(b,t1) ≤ 0.
Thus, by the optimality of a at t1 we have that b ∈ Bt1, and we are
done. 
Theorem 3. (Increasing extremal selections). Let X be a
chain, T be a poset and let u : X × T → R satisfy the single crossing
12property in (x,t).
If Bt has either a least element a∗ (t) or a greatest element a∗ (t) for
every t ∈ T (or both), then this element is an increasing functions.
Proof: Take any t1 < t2. Consider ﬁrst a∗ (t). Take any a ∈ Bt1.
By the previous theorem, c := min{a,a∗ (t2)} ∈ Bt1. Hence, a∗ (t1) ≤
c ≤ a∗ (t2). Analogously, for any b ∈ Bt2, by the previous theorem
d := max{b,a∗ (t1)} ∈ Bt2, and so a∗ (t1) ≤ d ≤ a∗ (t2). 
Conditions assuring that the argmax Bt has a least element and a
greatest element of every t in T are here the same as the standard
ones making it nonempty. Assume X compact in its interval topology
and u(x,t) upper semicontinuous in x for every t. Hence every Bt is
nonempty and compact. Compactness in the interval topology implies
that Bt has indeed a least and a greatest element. To understand why
this is so we will need an important topological result, that will be
presented later on in the paper as Theorem 7. See also the discussion
after Corollary 2 as well.
5. Monotone comparative statics on finite products of
chains
If X = Y × Z, where Y and Z are chains (for example, X is a
box in R2), then a natural way to extend to this context the deﬁnition
of monotonicity of the argmax Bt of u(y,z,t) over Y × Z is to use
coordinate-wise minima and maxima.
Pick any (y1,z1),(y2,z2) ∈ Y × Z. Deﬁne inﬁma and suprema as
(y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) = (min{y1,y2},min{z1,z2}),
(y1,z1) ∨ (y2,z2) = (max{y1,y2},max{z1,z2}).
Note that such inﬁma and suprema are well deﬁned exactly because Y
and Z are chains.
We say that Bt is increasing in t on T if for every t1 ≤ t2 in T, for
every (y1,z1) ∈ Bt1 and every (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2,
(y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt1,
(y1,z1) ∨ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2.
In this context, increasing diﬀerences of u(x,t) in (x,t), with x =
(y,z), and hence the single crossing property u(x,t) in (x,t), do no
longer suﬃce to guarantee that Bt is increasing. The reason is examined
in the following subsections.
135.1. Using cardinal complementarity for comparative statics
over a product of chains. Let:
X = {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)} ⊂ R
2.
X is the product of chain {0,1} by itself. Let T = {t1,t2}, with t1 < t2.
Let u : X × T → R be deﬁned as:
u((0,0),t1) = 0 u((0,0),t2) = 0
u((0,1),t1) = 8 u((0,1),t2) = 16
u((1,0),t1) = 10 u((1,0),t2) = 15
u((1,1),t1) = 1 u((1,1),t2) = 10
This function has increasing diﬀerences (hence satisﬁes the single
crossing property) in (x,t). Indeed, check for all x1 ≤ x2, with
x1,x2 ∈ {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}.
For x1 = (0,0):
u((1,0),t1) − u((0,0),t1) = 10 < 15 = u((1,0),t2) − u((0,0),t2)
u((0,1),t1) − u((0,0),t1) = 8 < 16 = u((0,1),t2) − u((0,0),t2)
u((1,1),t1) − u((0,0),t1) = 1 < 10 = u((1,1),t2) − u((0,0),t2)
For x1 = (0,1):
u((1,1),t1) − u((0,1),t1) = −7 < −6 = u((1,1),t2) − u((0,1),t2)
For x1 = (1,0):
u((1,1),t1) − u((1,0),t1) = −9 < −5 = u((1,1),t2) − u((1,0),t2)
For this function, Bt1 = {(1,0)} and Bt2 = {(0,1)}. Hence increas-
ingness of the argmax fails. What has happened here?
The problem is of course not in the notion of increasingness that
we adopted, which is the most natural one. The problem lies in the
deﬁnition of complementarity that we used.
Starting at the optimal bundle (1,0), a shift of the parameter from t1
to t2 makes indeed desirable to increase the amount of the second good,
as increasing diﬀerences shows by taking x1 = (1,0) < (1,1) = x2; that
is, the marginal utility of the second good increases with t:
u((1,1),t1) − u((1,0),t1) = −9 < −5 = u((1,1),t2) − u((1,0),t2).
Furthermore, a shift of the parameter from t1 to t2 makes desirable to
increase the amount of the ﬁrst good too (i.e. to keep it to 1, which is
the maximum amount allowed by our feasible set), as the last inequality
above also shows. So why (1,1) is not an optimal bundle at t2?
14The point is that we have not considered so far the eﬀect that an
increase in one of the two goods can have on the utility of increasing
the other good, everything else kept ﬁxed.
Indeed, for our utility function, as we will see immediately below the
marginal utility of the ﬁrst good decreases as the amount of the second
good increases, and vice versa, at any ﬁxed level of t. Hence, the two
goods are substitutes to each other, and the net eﬀect of increasing
the parameter t - as this eﬀect is determined by the function of the
example - is to increase the optimal consumption of the second good
but to decrease that of the ﬁrst good, ending up the re-optimization
process at bundle (0,1).
In other words, the problem in this example is that u(y,z,t), al-
beit having increasing diﬀerences in the pair ((y,z),t), has decreasing
diﬀerences in (y,z) for every t.
Take in fact y1 = 0 and y2 = 1. For ﬁxed t, the corresponding ﬁrst
diﬀerence of u(y,z,t) in y is decreasing in z, i.e. as z shifts from 0 to
1. Let’s check this.
For t = t1:
u((1,0),t1) − u((0,0),t1) = 10 > −7 = u((1,1),t1) − u((0,1),t1).
For t = t2:
u((1,0),t2) − u((0,0),t2) = 15 > −6 = u((1,1),t2) − u((0,1),t2).
Remark. When X is a chain, even a multidimensional chain, the
fact illustrated above can not happen. Indeed, in a chain, any real-
location following a parameter’s shift needs to take the form of either
an increase in the level of all goods, or a decrease. Hence the level of
all goods move in the same direction. Then, complementarity between
the bundle in X and the parameter suﬃces for monotone comparative
statics to hold. In some sense, on a chain all goods can be seen as
behaving as complements to each others.
Summing up. In this example monotone comparative statics has
failed because notwithstanding that each good is a complement to the
parameter, i.e. that u(y,z,t) has increasing diﬀerence in ((y,z),t), the
two goods are substitutes to each other, i.e. u(y,z,t) has decreasing
diﬀerences in (y,z) for every t.
In order to obtain the desired monotone comparative statics, we
need to assure not only that each one of the activities y and z is a
complement to the parameter t, but also that the activities y and z are
15complements to each other for each level of t. Hence we need to assume
both increasing diﬀerences of u(y,z,t) in ((y,z),t), and increasing dif-
ferences of u(y,z,t) in (y,z) for any ﬁxed t. Complementarities must
be pervasive. The comparative statics theorem in this context is then
the following:
Theorem 4. (Comp. statics on a product of chains, cardi-
nal case). Let Y and Z be a chains, T be a poset and u : Y ×Z×T →
R have increasing diﬀerences in ((y,z),t), and in (y,z) for every t in
T.
For every t1 < t2, for every (y1,z1) ∈ Bt1 and every (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2,
(y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt1 and (y1,z1) ∨ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2.
Proof: Apply the proof of theorem 5 below. 
5.2. Using ordinal complementarity for comparative statics
over a product of chains. If the choice space X is the product of
chains Y and Z, and if we use the ordinal notion of complementarity,
we need to take care of the non-symmetry of the induced complemen-
tarity relation. For u(y,z,t), assuming the single crossing property of
u in (y,z) for any ﬁxed t, and of u in ((y,z),t), is not enough.
Indeed, we are assuming that y is an ordinal complement to z at any
ﬁxed t, and that both y and z are ordinal complements to t. However,
we are not assuming that z is an ordinal complement to y for ﬁxed
t. As a result, we could well get that increasing t makes in the ﬁrst
place the level of both y and z increase, then the increase in z makes
y increase as well, but then we could get that the increase in y makes
z decrease. Hence there would be no deﬁnite result, ex-ante, on the
comparative statics of the maximizers’ set.
To avoid this, we need to assume also that z is an ordinal complement
to y. Hence, we need to assume for u(y,z,t) that the single crossing
property is satisﬁed in both (y,z) and (z,y), for any ﬁxed t.
This is done in the next theorem. After reading Section 6, it will be
clear that the proof of the theorem could have been made much shorter
and less pedantic. In the spirit of this paper, however, we have chosen
to explain in details the role and working of ordinal complementarity,
at the cost of a much longer and involved proof. A role that becomes
less clear when one works in a more general context such as that of
Section 6.
16Theorem 5. (Comp. statics on a product of chains, or-
dinal case). Let Y and Z be a chains and T be a poset. Let u :
Y × Z × T → R satisfy the single crossing property in ((y,z),t), and
in both (y,z) and (z,y) for every t ∈ T.
For every t1 < t2, for every (y1,z1) ∈ Bt1 and every (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2,
(y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt1 and (y1,z1) ∨ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2.
Proof: Pick any (y1,z1) ∈ Bt1 and any (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2. If (y1,z1) ≤
(y2,z2), we are done.
Case (A): If (y2,z2) ≤ (y1,z1) then, by the theorem on comparative
statics on chains, the single crossing property in ((y,z),t) suﬃces for
the result.
Case (B): Let y2 < y1 and z1 < z2. Here we need the single crossing
in ((y,z),t) and in (y,z). By optimality of (y1,z1) at t = t1, we have
that:
u(y1,z1,t1) − u(y2,z1,t1) ≥ 0,
and so by the single crossing property in (y,z),
u(y1,z2,t1) − u(y2,z2,t1) ≥ 0.
Since (y2,z2) < (y1,z2) and t1 < t2, by the single crossing property in
((y,z),t) we have that:
u(y1,z2,t2) − u(y2,z2,t2) ≥ 0,
and by optimality of (y2,z2) at t = t2, (y1,z2) = (y1,z1)∨(y2,z2) ∈ Bt2.
Analogously, by optimality of (y2,z2) at t = t2,
u(y2,z2,t2) − u(y1,z2,t2) ≥ 0,
and so by the single crossing in (y,z) and by the fact that u takes
values in a chain,
u(y2,z1,t2) − u(y1,z1,t2) ≥ 0.
Since (y2,z2) < (y1,z2) and t1 < t2, then again by the single crossing
in ((y,z),t),
u(y2,z1,t1) − u(y1,z1,t1) ≥ 0.
Hence by optimality of (y1,z1) at t = t1, we have that (y2,z1) =
(y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt1, and we are done.
Case (C): Let now y1 < y2 and z2 < z1. Here we need the single
crossing in ((y,z),t) and in (z,y). By optimality of (y1,z1) at t = t1,
u(y1,z1,t1) − u(y1,z2,t1) ≥ 0.
17By the single crossing property in (z,y),
u(y2,z1,t1) − u(y2,z2,t1) ≥ 0.
Since (y2,z2) < (y2,z1) and t1 < t2, then by the single crossing in
((y,z),t) we have that:
u(y2,z1,t2) − u(y2,z2,t2) ≥ 0.
Hence by optimality again, (y2,z1) = (y1,z1) ∨ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt2. In the
same way, by optimality,
u(y2,z2,t2) − u(y2,z1,t2) ≥ 0.
Hence by the single crossing in (z,y),
u(y1,z2,t2) − u(y1,z1,t2) ≥ 0.
Again, because (y2,z2) < (y2,z1) and t1 < t2, by the single crossing in
((y,z),t) we have that:
u(y1,z2,t1) − u(y1,z1,t1) ≥ 0,
and so, by optimality, (y1,z2) = (y1,z1) ∧ (y2,z2) ∈ Bt1. 
Corollary 2. (Increasing extremal selections). Let Y and Z
be chains, T be a poset and u : Y × Z × T → R satisfy the single
crossing property in ((y,z)t) and in both (y,z) and (z,y) for every
t ∈ T.
If Bt has either a least element a∗ (t) or a greatest element a∗ (t) for
every t ∈ T (or both), then this element is an increasing function.
Proof: Take any t1 < t2. Consider a∗ (t). Take any c ∈ Bt1. By the
previous theorem, c ∧ a∗ (t2) ∈ Bt1. Hence,
a∗ (t1) ≤ c ∧ a∗ (t2) ≤ a∗ (t2).
Analogously, for any b ∈ Bt2, by the previous theorem a∗ (t1)∨b ∈ Bt2,
and so
a
∗ (t1) ≤ a
∗ (t1) ∨ b ≤ a
∗ (t2).

The conditions assuring that the argmax Bt has indeed a least and a
greatest element are the same conditions assuring that it is nonempty,
namely that the choice set is compact in the interval topology and
that the objective function is upper semicontinuous in the decision
variables at each value of the parameter. To explain why, we need
further deﬁnitions and an important topological result, presented as
Theorem 7 below. See also the discussion after Corollary 3.
186. Monotone comparative statics on lattices
If the choice set X is a poset which is not a ﬁnite product of chains
(for example a circle in the plane), then pointwise inﬁma and suprema
of pairs of elements of X do not need to exist (or to be in X). To
extend to this context the notion of increasingness of Bt that we have
used so far, we need to introduce lattices.
Deﬁnition 6. (Lattice) Let X be a nonempty poset. X is a lattice
if for every x1,x2 ∈ X, x1 ∧ x2 ∈ X and x1 ∨ x2 ∈ X (where the ﬁrst
expression denotes the inﬁmum and the latter denotes the supremum
of {x1,x2} in X).
We now introduce, in the context of lattices, a notion of increasing-
ness that is due to Veinott7. We call it Veinott-increasingness and point
out that, if X is either a chain or a product of chains, it coincides with
increasingness in the sense of the previous sections of this paper.
Deﬁnition 7. (Veinott-increasingness) Let X be a lattice and
F : x ∈ X 7→ Fx ⊆ X be a correspondence. We say that F is Veinott-
increasing if for every x,y ∈ X, with x ≤ y, for every v ∈ Fx and every
z ∈ Fy, v ∧ z ∈ Fx and v ∨ z ∈ Fy.
There is an important diﬀerence with the previous sections. Albeit
increasing diﬀerences and the single crossing property can still be de-
ﬁned on X × T, these properties may be insuﬃcient to investigate the
behavior of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of u(x,t), hence to produce the desired
comparative statics conclusions, when X is a general lattice.
Let us elaborate more on this. Let X be a lattice, T be a poset,
and u(x,t) : X × T → R have the single crossing property in (x,t).
Let as usual Bt denote the argmax of u(x,t) over X. Take unordered
x1 ∈ Bt1 and x2 ∈ Bt2. By optimality of x1 at t1, the ﬁrst diﬀerence
u(x1,t1) − u(x1 ∧ x2,t1)
is greater than or equal to zero. By the single crossing property, the
same holds at t = t2. And this is all we can say by using the single
crossing property8. In particular, we do not reach any statement about
the eventual non negativity of the ﬁrst diﬀerence
u(x1 ∨ x2,t2) − u(x2,t2),
which is what we need to asses whether Bt is Veinott-increasing or not.
7See Topkis (1978).
8Analogously were we using increasing diﬀerences.
19Note that this problem is due exactly to the fact that lattice X is no
longer assumed to be the product of chains. A solution to the problem
consists in having a property of u(x,t) that relates in the right way,
for ﬁxed t in T and for any x1,x2 in X, the two ﬁrst diﬀerences above.
This property is called supermodularity. Its ordinal version, quasisu-
permodularity, which remains preserved under ordinal transformations
of payoﬀs, has been introduced by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
Deﬁnition 8. ((Quasi)supermodularity). Let X be a lattice. A
function u(x) : X → R. is supermodular on X if for every x1,x2 ∈ X,
u(x1) + u(x2) ≤ u(x1 ∧ x2) + u(x1 ∨ x2).
Function u(x) is quasisupermodular on X if for every x1,x2 ∈ X,
u(x1 ∧ x2) ≤ u(x1) ⇒ u(x2) ≤ u(x1 ∨ x2);
u(x1 ∧ x2) < u(x1) ⇒ u(x2) < u(x1 ∨ x2).
In general lattices X, (quasi)supermodularity has not a direct inter-
pretation in terms of complementarity. It only make the choice vari-
ables in X behave “consistently” with complementarity, but it is not
complementarity itself. It is essentially a useful mathematical device.
But, as Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 show, the interpretation in terms of
complementarity is completely restored as soon as X takes the more
familiar forms that we considered in the previous sections.
Lemma 3. (Characterization of supermodularity in terms
of increasing differences). Let X = Y ×Z and u(y,z) : X → R.
(i) If Y and Z are chains and u(y,z) has increasing diﬀerences in
(y,z) on Y × Z, then it is supermodular in (y,z) on Y × Z.
(ii) If Y and Z are lattices, and u(y,z) is supermodular in (y,z) on
Y × Z, then it has increasing diﬀerences in (y,z) on Y × Z.
Proof: (i) Take any unordered x0 = (y0,z0),x00 = (y00,z00) in Y × Z
(if they are ordered supermodularity holds trivially). Let, without loss
of generality, x0 ∧x00 = (y0,z00) and x0 ∨x00 = (y00,z0) (here we are using











(ii) Pick any (y0,z0) ≤ (y00,z00) in the lattice Y × Z. For x0 := (y0,z00)









which is increasing diﬀerences. 
Lemma 4. (Vector supermodularity). Let u(x) : X → R,
where X = X1 ×···×Xn and each factor is a chain. Function u(x) is
supermodular in (x1,...,xn) on X if and only if for every (x0
1,...,x0
n)











: Xh × Xi → R
is supermodular in (xh,xi) on Xh × Xi.
Proof: Necessity is trivial. As for suﬃciency, since u(x) is super-
modular in each pair of variables (xh,xi), then by Lemma 3 u(x) has
increasing diﬀerences in each (xh,xi) (ﬁx the value of all the other en-
tries xk, k 6= h,i, and apply the proof of point (ii) of Lemma 3). To
get the statement, apply then Lemma 2. 
Lemma 5. (Differential characterization of supermodu-
larity). Let u(x) : Rn → R be twice diﬀerentiable on Rn. Function
u(x) is supermodular on Rn if and only, for every x in Rn and every
h,i = 1,...,n with h 6= i, uxhxi (x) ≥ 0.
Proof: By Lemma 4, u(x) has increasing diﬀerence in each pair of
variables. Apply then Lemma 1, the diﬀerential characterization of
increasing diﬀerences. 
The diﬀerence between Lemma 6 below and Lemma 3 - in which we
have characterized supermodularity in terms of increasing diﬀerences
- lies in the fact that, in the deﬁnition of quasisupermodularity, when
we interchange the roles of the two initial points x1,x2 of lattice X we
obtain diﬀerent statements. This is not true for supermodularity.
Lemma 6. (Characterization of quasisupermodularity in
terms of the single crossing property) Let X := Y × Z and
u(y,z) : X → R.
(i) If Y and Z are chains and u(y,z) has the single crossing property
in both (y,z) and (z,y) on Y ×Z, then it is quasisupermodular in (y,z)
on Y × Z.
(ii) If Y and Z are lattices and u(y,z) is quasisupermodular in (y,z)
on Y × Z, then it has the single crossing property in both (y,z) and
(z,y) on Y × Z.
21Proof: (i) Take any unordered (y0,z0),(y00,z00) in Y × Z (if they
are ordered quasisupermodularity holds trivially). Let, without loss of
generality, x0 ∧ x00 = (y0,z00) and x0 ∨ x00 = (y00,z0) (here we are using






Hence this ﬁrst diﬀerence of u(y,z) in z is (strictly) positive at y0, and













Hence this ﬁrst diﬀerence of u(y,z) in y is (strictly) positive at z00, and








(ii) Pick any (y0,z0) ≤ (y00,z00) in the lattice Y × Z. For x0 :=


















which is the single crossing property of u(y,z) in (y,z). 
We now prove the monotone comparative statics theorem for the
general context of lattices. We prove the general ordinal version of
the theorem, due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Theorems 2 and
5 are special cases of Theorem 6. The the proof of Theorem 5 would
have been written in a much shorter and transparent way, had we used
quasisupermodularity instead.
In the case where the optimization is constrained, if we add to the
condition t1 < t2 in Theorem 6 that the constraint set shifts according
to the Veinott set-relation, then we obtain that quasisupermodular-
ity and the single crossing property are not only suﬃcient, but also
necessary to conclude that the argmax is Veinott increasing.
22Theorem 6. (Comparative statics on lattices, Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994.) Let X be a lattice, T be a poset, and u(x,t) :
X × T → R.
If u(x,t) is quasisupermodular in x on X for every t in T, and has
the single crossing property in (x,t) on X × T, then the argmax Bt of
u(x,t) over X is a Veinott-increasing correspondence; that is, for every
t1 < t2 in T, for every x1 ∈ Bt1 and every x2 ∈ Bt2, x1 ∧ x2 ∈ Bt1 and
x1 ∨ x2 ∈ Bt2.
Proof: Take any x1 ∈ Bt1 and any x2 ∈ Bt2. By optimality,
u(x1 ∧ x2,t1) ≤ u(x1,t1),
and so by quasisupermodularity
u(x2,t1) ≤ u(x1 ∨ x2,t1).
Because x2 ≤ x1 ∨ x2 and t1 < t2, by the single crossing property
u(x2,t2) ≤ u(x1 ∨ x2,t2).
Thus, by optimality, x1 ∨ x2 ∈ Bt2. For the other part, by optimality,
u(x1 ∨ x2,t2) ≤ u(x2,t2).
Hence by quasisupermodularity
u(x1,t2) ≤ u(x1 ∧ x2,t2),
and by the single crossing property,
u(x1,t1) ≤ u(x1 ∧ x1,t1).
Hence, by optimality, x1 ∧ x2 ∈ Bt1. 
Corollary 3. (Increasing extremal selections). Let X be a
lattice and T be a poset. Let u(x,t) : X×T → R be quasisupermodular
in x on X for every t in T, and have the single crossing property in (x,t)
on X × T. If Bt has either a least element a∗ (t) or a greatest element
a∗ (t) for every t ∈ T (or both), then this element in an increasing
functions.
Proof: Take any t1 < t2. Consider a∗ (t). Take any c ∈ Bt1. By the
previous theorem, c ∧ a∗ (t2) ∈ Bt1. Hence,
a∗ (t1) ≤ c ∧ a∗ (t2) ≤ a∗ (t2).
Analogously, for any b ∈ Bt2, by the previous theorem a∗ (t1)∨b ∈ Bt2,
and so
a
∗ (t1) ≤ a
∗ (t1) ∨ b ≤ a
∗ (t2).
23
The conditions assuring that every Bt has a least and a greatest
element are those making it nonempty. We need a further result. This
discussion applies to the previous Sections as well.
Deﬁnition 9. (Complete lattice). Let X be a nonempty lattice.
X is a complete lattice if for every nonempty subset S ⊆ X, inf S ∈ X
and supS ∈ X.
What we care about here is that, on setting S = X, a complete lattice
has a least and a greatest element. We need the following important
topological result.
Theorem 7. (Topological characterization of complete-
ness). A lattice is compact in its interval topology if and only if it is
complete.
Proof: Birkhoﬀ, 1967, Ch. X, Theorem 20. 
Assume then that X is compact in its interval topology and that
u(x,t) is upper semicontinuous in x for every t. Hence every Bt is
nonempty and compact. Furthermore, by theorem 6, on setting t1 = t2,
we see that every Bt is indeed a lattice (a sublattice of X). Thus, by
Theorem 7, every Bt is a complete lattice, and so it has a least and a
greatest element.
For the previous Sections, hence, just assume that the chain X and
the product of chains Y ×Z are compact in their interval topology, and
apply the same argument.
7. Games with Strategic Complementarities
Games with strategic complementarities (GSC) are essentially games
where each player’s payoﬀ is (quasi)supermodular in own strategies and
has (the single crossing property) increasing diﬀerences in each pair
(x,y), where x is any own strategy and y is any proﬁle of opponents’
strategies.
In view of the diﬀerential characterization of increasing diﬀerences,
it is clear that GSC are appealing as far as checking conditions on
payoﬀs is concerned. However, and more importantly, GSC are relevant
because of their nice properties. Namely, in a GSC Nash equilibria
exists, the Nash set is a complete lattice, and furthermore the extremal
Nash equilibria have well-determinate comparative statics properties
and are rationalizable.
24Theorem 6 represents the ﬁrst of two fundamental results in the
construction of games with strategic complementarities. The second
fundamental result is Theorem 8 below, a ﬁxpoint theorem due inde-
pendently to Veinott (1992) and Zhou (1994), and which is an extension
to correspondences of the famous ﬁxpoint theorem of Tarski. Thus,
GSC are a merge of new comparative statics results and new ﬁxpoint
results.
We report here Veinott-Zhou ﬁxpoint theorem in a slightly diﬀerent,
more general version due to Calciano (2009). We have chosen here
to use results from Calciano (2009) to make the paper entirely self-
contained, as will become clear in the sequel of this section.
In this section, contrary to the rest of the paper, we have decided to
omit some proofs, namely those of Theorems 8 and 9. This is because
these proofs are more advanced and not so consistent to the scope of
this paper, which remains to clarify the notion of complementarity that
lies at the heart of modern industrial organization.
Some more notation is needed. Let X be a poset and associate to a
correspondence F : X → X the two sets:
A := {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ F (x) : x ≤ y};
B := {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ F (x) : y ≤ x}.
Set A is the set of elements x of X at which F jumps above the
diagonal. Set B is the dual of A. The ﬁxpoint set of F is a subset of
the intersection of A and B. We say that correspondence F : X → X
has a greatest (least) element if for every x ∈ X, the set F (x) has a
greatest (least) element.
Theorem 8. (Veinott 1992, Zhou 1994, Calciano 2009). Let
X be a complete lattice and F : X → X be a correspondence. If F is
Veinott-increasing and has both a greatest and a least element, then:
(a) ∨A and ∧B are, respectively, the greatest and least ﬁxpoint of F;
(b) the ﬁxpoint set of F is a complete lattice.
In the original theorems of Veinott and Zhou, the correspondence
F is assumed to be subcomplete-sublattice-valued. In other words, in
these theorems F is assumed to be such that, for every x ∈ X, the
inﬁmum and supremum in X of all subsets of F (x) lie in F (x). In
Theorem 8 we required this property to hold only for set F (x) itself.
25The generalization contained in Calciano (2009) is indeed wider, since
it concerns the increasingness notion as well.
All the remarks above apply to the next theorem too, which is the
fundamental comparative statics result for the study of the behavior of
extremal Nash equilibria.
Theorem 9. (Topkis 1998, Calciano 2009). Let X be a com-
plete lattice, T be a poset and F : X × T → X be a correspondence.
If F is Veinott-increasing in (x,t) and has both a greatest and a least
element, then:
(a) for every t in T the correspondence F (.,t) has a greatest and a
least ﬁxpoint, and these ﬁxpoints are increasing in t;
(b) if, in addition, ∨F (x,t0) < ∧F (x,t00) for every x in X and every
t0 < t00 in T, then both the least and greatest ﬁxpoints of F (.,t) are
strictly increasing in t.
We now ﬁnally introduce GSC. Let Γ be a game over a players set I





is the space of strategy proﬁles, and
u := (ui)i∈I
is the vector of players’ payoﬀs ui : X → R. We do not put any
restriction on strategies. The normal form may be in pure strategies,
in mixed strategies, in correlated strategies. Furthermore, a continuum
of pure strategies is perfectly allowed. Let
F : X → X
be the joint best reply correspondence of the game.
Deﬁnition 10. (Games with strategic complementarities
(GSC)). A game Γ has strategic complementarities if:
(i) each individual strategy space Xi is a complete lattice;
(ii) F is nonempty and has both a greatest and a least element;
(iii) F is Veinott-increasing.
The most important property of a GSC is the following.
Proposition 1. (Non-emptiness and structure of equilib-
rium set). The Nash set of a GSC is a nonempty complete lattice
Proof: Apply Theorem 8 to the joint best reply F of the game. 
26Let [e,e] be the Nash set of a GSC, where e and e are the least and
greatest Nash equilibria, respectively. The following result describes
the comparative statics of e and e.
Proposition 2. (Comparative statics of equilibria). Let T
be a partially ordered set and (Γt)t∈T be a collection of games with
strategic complementarities. Let F : X × T → X associate, to every
t ∈ T, the joint best reply F (.,t) of game Γt.
If F is Veinott-increasing in (x,t) and has both a greatest and a least
element, then:
(a) the least and greatest Nash equilibria, e(t) and e(t), are increasing
in t;
(b) if, in addition, ∨F (x,t0) < ∧F (x,t00) for every x in X and every
t0 < t00 in T, then e(t) and e(t) are strictly increasing in t.
Proof: Apply Theorem 9 to the joint best reply F of the game. 
Deﬁnition 11. ((Quasi)supermodular game). A game Γ is (quasi)
supermodular if:
(i) every Xi is a lattice compact in its interval topology;
(ii) every individual payoﬀ function ui (xi,x−i) is upper semi-continuous
in own strategies xi for every opponents’ strategy proﬁle x−i;
(iii) every individual payoﬀ function is (quasi)supermodular in own
strategies xi for every opponents’ strategy proﬁle x−i, and has (the
single crossing property) increasing diﬀerences in (xi,x−i).
For a game Γ, being quasisupermodular is a suﬃcient condition for
being a GSC.
Proposition 3. A quasisupermodular game, hence a supermodular
game, is a GSC.
Proof: The topological assumptions make the joint best reply F have
a greatest and a least element, as we have seen in Theorem 7. Qua-
sisupermodularity and the single crossing property make it be Veinott-
increasing, as we have seen in Theorem 6. 
We recall that pure strategy xi of player i is serially undominated
if it survives the iterative process of removing from the game strongly
dominated strategies (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, for details). It
is well-known that only serially undominated strategies can be ratio-
nalizable, and only serially udominated strategies can be played (can
27receive positive probability) in a pure Nash equilibrium, in a mixed
Nash equilibrium, or in a correlated equilibrium.
The following result says that the set of serially undominated strate-
gies of a GSC is contained in its Nash set. Hence if the equilibrium is
unique, a GSC is dominance-solvable.
Proposition 4. (Dominance solvability). Let Γ be a supermod-
ular game. For each player i, there exists least and greatest rationaliz-
able strategies, xi and xi. Furthermore, the strategy proﬁles (xi,i ∈ I)
and (xi,i ∈ I) are Nash equilibria.
Proof: This is Milgrom and Roberts (1990)’s main theorem, theorem
5. 
8. Applications to Cournot and Bertrand competition
This section contains examples of how to use supermodular games
in applications. The applications concern basic IO models, and are
presented here for the sake of illustrating some aspects of the techniques
that are less clear and not so used in the applied literature but that,
we believe, can be useful and conductive of new applications.
We start from basic problems in IO and transform them into super-
modular games. To save space and notation, we treat every application
as an individual decision problem. The extension to games is imme-
diate, just consider every revenue function treated below as the payoﬀ
of a typical player. We remark that there is no implicit assumption of
symmetry; we are just avoiding to index players.
8.1. Monotone comparative statics on a chain. Bertrand com-
petition with linear demand curves. A ﬁrm with constant mar-
ginal cost c > 0 choose own scalar price p ∈ [c,+∞), against the pricing






















with β,γ > 0.





288.2. Monotone comparative statics on a chain. Cournot duopoly
with substitute products. A ﬁrm choose quantity (capacity) q ∈
[0,+∞) to maximize
Π(q,q−i) = qP (q,q−i) − C (q),
against its opponent decision on its own capacity q−i ∈ [0,+∞).
P (q,q−i) is the inverse demand function, and C (q) is the cost function.
We make the following assumptions:
1.P (q,q−i) is decreasing in q−i, hence the products are gross substitutes
(we use uncompensated demand functions). This is typical in Cournot
duopoly.
2.P (q,q−i) has decreasing diﬀerences in (q,q−i), meaning that own de-
mand is less elastic when opponent’s production is higher: the decrease
of own price following an increase in own production is decreasing as
opponent’s production is higher.
As such, the problem in not supermodular. We make it supermod-
ular by selection of the order. Given the total order ([0,+∞),≤),




∀a,b ∈ [0,+∞),a ≤
d b ⇔ b ≤ a.
Consider the new decision problem where q is chosen in [0,+∞) and
q−i is now chosen in the dual [0,+∞)
d, which is [0,+∞) endowed with
≤d













in [0,+∞) × [0,+∞)
d such that




−i. So, in the original decision






























which is exactly increasing diﬀerence of P in (q,q−i) on [0,+∞) ×
[0,+∞)
d, i.e. the ﬁrst diﬀerence of P in q increases as q−i increased in
[0,+∞)
d.














d such that q0 ≤
q00 and q0
−i ≤d q00
































Since, in the original problem, P (q,q−i) is decreasing in q−i on [0,+∞),
by the same argument as in Claim 1 above P (q,q−i) is now increasing
in q−i on the dual order [0,+∞)
d. Hence, in the inequality above, both



































The inequality above is what we needed.
Comparative statics conclusion: The set of optimal capacities
for the ﬁrm is increasing in q0
−i on the dual [0,+∞)
d, hence it is de-
creasing in q0
−i on [0,+∞). As the opponent increases production, its
optimal for the ﬁrm to decrease own production. Indeed, product sub-
stitution implies that by increasing production, the opponent lowers
its price and steals consumers from the ﬁrm, which needs to lower own
production to keep proﬁts.
8.3. Monotone comparative statics on the product of chains.
Pricing and advertising in Bertrand competition with substi-
tute products. This example is taken from Topkis (1995). A ﬁrm
with constant marginal cost c > 0 chooses its price p ∈ [c,+∞), and
its advertising eﬀort a ∈ [0,+∞), against the pricing of its competitors
p−i ∈ Rn











We make the following assumptions:




is increasing in a.
2. The demand function is increasing in p−i. This means that com-
petitors’ products are gross substitutes to that of the ﬁrm (we consider
uncompensated demand).
3. The demand function is supermodular in (p,a), meaning that an in-
crease in own price leads to a loss of demand (if demand is decreasing)
which is less, if quality is higher.





meaning that (i) the loss of demand for increasing own prices is miti-
gated when opponents’ substitute products are priced higher, since less
30consumers are willing to leave own market because substitute prod-
ucts are more expensive, and (ii) the increase in demand for increasing
advertising is higher when opponents’ substitute products are priced
higher, since the ﬁrm has then a wider market share.
Claim: The proﬁt function is supermodular in (p,a) on [c,+∞) ×













































































In the last inequality, the two terms in square brackets are nonposi-
tive, due to increasingness of D in p−i. Furthermore, the last inequality
holds without the multiplying factors (p00 − c) and (p0 − c), by the as-





both p00 ≥ c and p0 ≥ c, the last inequality holds.











−i, and redo the same argument as above,
by recalling that the assumption of supermodularity of demand in the
vector variable (p,a) is equivalent of it having increasing diﬀerences in
(p,a). This time, however, we need to use increasingness of demand in
a.
Comparative statics conclusion: Optimal prices and advertis-
ing levels are increasing in the parameters p−i. Note that if also op-
ponents set their advertising level a−i, and if own demand D is de-
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